Moving the WTO Forward - One Case at a Time by Howse, Robert
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 42
Issue 2 Spring 2009 Article 3
Moving the WTO Forward - One Case at a Time
Robert Howse
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howse, Robert (2009) "Moving the WTO Forward - One Case at a Time," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 42: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol42/iss2/3
Moving the WTO Forward-One Case
at a Time
Robert Howset
The story that I would like to tell here could be said to reflect common
law prejudice about what makes legal systems work. It is the following:
that any legal system, if it is going to be effective, has to be able to evolve
incrementally through practice.' A legal system that can only respond to
change-to changing values, technology, and events-through dramatic
constitutional moments resulting in an explicit and comprehensive break
with the past, is unlikely to be an effective legal system.2
This is necessarily a controversial and contestable assumption. But
based on that assumption, I want to argue that the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) legal system, and particularly the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem, possesses some of the characteristics of an effective or efficacious
legal system that I have defined or at least declared to be connected to the
capacity for evolution through incremental practice. The WTO dispute set-
tlement system has demonstrated its efficacy by evolving incrementally
through practice without a formal change in the treaty mandate that estab-
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1. See Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute
Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 411 (2008) (modeling Posner's
hypothesis that common law tends toward greater efficiency and arguing that evolution
of case law provides better outcomes than statutory law).
2. See Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman's Higher Lawmaking in Comparative Constitutional
Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 193,
210-14 (2008) (discussing how constitutional moments can be interpreted as constitu-
tional failures).
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lished and defined the parameters of that system. 3
The particular area that I am going to address is the place of non-
governmental actors. The WTO dispute settlement system, like the WTO
itself, is a product of the post-Cold War environment. 4 The Uruguay
Round negotiations began and went quite far before the end of the Cold
War, but the end of the Cold War and related global developments influ-
enced, in particular, the creation of what one might call the crown jewel of
the WTO legal system-the Appellate Body.5 The two great tendencies that
have affected the overall structure and course of international law since the
Cold War are 1) globalization 6 and 2) what Professor Ruti Teitel has called
the "humanity-law" revolution-the reorientation of international law
toward the interests, values, and rights of persons and peoples, not just
states, through the evolution of human rights law, the law of war, and
humanitarian law. 7 I think that Professor Teitel is absolutely correct that
the "humanity-law" revolution is a fundamental change that has altered
perceptions of, hopes for, and fears from international law in certain parts
of the world in very basic ways.8
However, when we turn to the WTO system and the dispute settlement
system in particular, we see a disconnect with these tendencies. Although
the humanity-law revolution was already starting to take place toward the
end of the Uruguay Round-post-Cold War transitional justice being one
element that helped develop it 9 -the WTO dispute settlement system seems
to be mired in the classic Westphalian or statist understanding of the
nature of international law. 10 The WTO serves-at least directly-the val-
ues, the interests, and the prerogatives of sovereign states." Hence, the
3. See Alan Yanovich, The Evolving WTO Dispute Settlement System, in THE WTO IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA
248, 248-49 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 2007) (stating that the factor explaining the
success of the WTO dispute settlement system is its ability to evolve).
4. Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 237, 243 (2000).
5. See Richard L. Bernal, Debra P. Steger & Andrew L. Stoler, Comment, Key Proce-
dural Issues: Resources, 32 INT'L LAw. 871, 878 (1998) ("The Appellate Body is often cited
as the crown jewel of the WTO DSU .... "); Anna Lanoszka, The Promises of Multilateral-
ism and the Hazards of 'Single Undertaking': The Breakdown of Decision Making Within the
WTO, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 655, 662-63 (2008) (stating that the Cold War mentality
influenced the start and completion of the Uruguay Round).
6. The relationship between globalization and the WTO is obvious. See Robert
Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528,
1528 (2008) (book review).
7. See Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355, 357-58 (2002) [hereinafter Humanity's Law].
8. See id. at 360.
9. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 69, 70 (2003)
(noting that the post-Cold War period shaped the wave of democratic transitions and
modernization associated with the humanity-law revolution).
10. Craig VanGrasstek & Pierre Sauve, The Consistency of WTO Rules: Can the Single
Undertaking Be Squared with Variable Geometry?, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 837, 852 (2006)
("GATT and the WTO are based upon the cardinal, Westphalian principle of sovereign
equality .... ").
11. See James Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO and the International Rule
of Law, 44 H~Auv. INT' L.J. 533, 547 (2003).
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mantra that the WTO is a member- (meaning member state) driven
organization. 12
Thus, when we look at the Dispute Settlement Understanding
13
(DSU), we find nothing that provides directly for the participation of gov-
ernmental actors, persons, and peoples in the system. 14 Similarly, there is
nothing in the DSU that explicitly suggests or insists on accountability for
non-state actors or stakeholders in the multilateral trading system. 15
The DSU contemplates non-transparent proceedings that limit the abil-
ity of persons and peoples to understand what is happening and makes it
difficult for people to recognize the way in which member states make deci-
sions that may affect their interests and touch their values.' 6 In an era
where the legitimacy of and expectations for international law are starting
to be fundamentally shaped by this humanity-law revolution, we seem to
have a system that was produced by older, classical assumptions of interna-
tional law, where the primary, if not only, relevant international actors are
sovereign states.17 Therefore, the risk of a kind of legitimacy crisis exists
as the system runs up against a normative trend to which it is unable to
adapt. 18
Within the very narrow parameters that the WTO treaty texts
afforded, it is remarkable how the system has succeeded in making some
adaptations to the new "humanity-law" world. 19 Each adaptation is in
itself small and at the margins, but as Alexis de Tocqueville-among
others-has shown us, even small changes can lead to new perspectives,
12. See id.
13. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
14. See LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 240 (The New Press 2004).
15. Id. at 15.
16. See Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Agreement:
An Inadequate Mechanism for the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 2 PEPP. DisP.
RESOL. LJ. 99, 106-07 (2002).
17. See Humanity's Law, supra note 7, at 369-70 (describing the tension between the
Westphalian nation-state system and the increasingly prevalent humanitarian law); see
also John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97
Am. J. INT'L L. 782, 782 (2003) ("The old 'Westphalian' concept in the context of a
nation-state's 'right' to monopolize certain exercises of power with respect to its territory
and citizens has been discredited in many ways .... ). But see Stephen D. Krasner,
Abiding Sovereignty, 22 INT'L POL. Sc. REv. 229, 231 (2001) (arguing that globalization
and the rise of other transnational actors will alter but not weaken state sovereignty in
international relations).
18. See A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of Inter-
national Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 133-34
(2001) (arguing that the inability of Westphalian notions of state sovereignty to adapt to
changes in international law has led to a legitimacy crisis).
19. See Robert Howse, WTO Governance and the Doha Round, 5 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1,
5-6 (2005) (describing the WTO trend toward accepting input from other institutions
and allowing more transparency in its negotiations).
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new vistas, and new understandings of what is legitimate.20 These small
changes may be the basis for larger, sweeping, or fundamental changes on
a longer-term basis.2 1 For example, incremental changes may create differ-
ences of perspective and attitude that can actually unblock the route to
more basic changes in the long term.
One example of incremental change is the use of amicus briefs. There
is nothing in the DSU that seems to allow non-governmental actors to for-
mally participate in the dispute settlement process.22 The Appellate Body,
acting in the best traditions of a judiciary charged with developing its own
practice out of a relatively incomplete code of civil procedure, found within
the incompleteness of that code the space to have a basis for submissions
of amicus briefs-not the formal right to have an amicus brief taken into
account, but the possibility of access at the discretion of the judges. 23 The
Appellate Body has occasionally used this procedure, and its existence has
been affirmed.2 4 Although this procedure does not seem to have had a
dramatic effect-the Appellate Body has never come out and said, "Because
of the amicus brief, we have decided this way or that"-such reliance is
equally rare in the case of domestic constitutional courts.
2 5
20. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 456-59 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., Penguin Putnam Inc. 2004) (1835) (explaining how the American people do not
change their underlying principles, but instead make small, progressive adjustments).
21. Id.
22. See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 197 (2005) ("Under the current rules, [amicus curiae]
do not have the right to be heard or to participate, in any way, in the proceedings."). See
generally DSU.
23. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, J9[ 105-108, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp
Appellate Body Report] (finding that Articles 12.1 and 13 of DSU allow the panel to
consider whether to accept information and advice from unsolicited sources); see also
Eric L. White, Written and Oral Submissions in WTO Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUES & LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER
INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS 121, 127 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000).
24. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, 91 51, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter
Asbestos Appellate Body Report] (nothing that in November 2000 the Appellate Body
adopted an additional procedure to deal with amicus briefs); Appellate Body Report,
European Communities- Trade Description of Sardines, 9191 164-167, WT/DS231/AB/R
(Sept. 26, 2002) (accepting an amicus brief from a WTO member); Appellate Body
Report, United States- Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 9191 38-42, WT/DS138/
AB/R (May 10, 2000) (ruling that the Appellate Body itself has the authority to accept
and consider amicus briefs). But see General Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the
Centre William Rappard on 22 November 2000, 9191 114-118, WT/GC/M/60 (Jan. 23,
2001) (addressing members' concerns that "since there was no specific provision regard-
ing amicus briefs such briefs should not be accepted").
25. See Petko D. Kantchevski, Note, The Differences Between the Panel Procedures of
the GATT and the WTO: The Role of GATT and WTO Panels in Trade Dispute Settlement, 3
BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 79, 127 (2006); see, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
743 (2000) (discussing the increasing trend of amicus brief influence collectively, but
failing to mention an individual brief relied on for an decision).
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Amicus practice has shifted the attitudes of a number of non-govern-
mental actors who see their values as being affected by the system. The
practice has made them more conscious of their capacity to express views
in a number of different ways: not just through the amicus route, but also
by giving expert opinions, via advocacy, via lobbying, and by making pub-
lic statements about litigation in a variety of contexts.2
6
Another respect in which incremental change has occurred comes
from an unusual source-trade officials, who are known for adhering to the
"member-driven" ideology of the WTO. 27 As a general rule, the DSU pro-
vides for confidentiality of its written and oral proceedings. 28 Increasingly,
parties in WTO litigation have been making their pleadings in WTO dis-
putes public, often posting them to the Internet. 29 Recently, the parties to
the second round of the EC- Hormones dispute30 agreed to open up of the
oral proceedings to the public.3 1 In the case of the panel proceedings, the
DSU did not provide explicitly for such a possibility. 3 2 In the case of the
Appellate Body, much more dramatically, the DSU appeared to require con-
fidential proceedings. 3 3 Thus, the Appellate Body, in agreeing to open up
its hearing to the public in EC- Hormones, had to deemphasize the mean-
ing of confidentiality in the DSU, reading it as not applying to every aspect
of the appellate process. These last developments have occurred at a time
when the capacity of the system to evolve through diplomatic negotiations
has been in question (see, for example, the impasse of the Doha Round
negotiations). 34
It is interesting to reflect on the relationship between judicial inven-
tiveness and the impasse of the Doha Round negotiations. Some commen-
tators, such as former Appellate Body Member Claus-Dieter Ehlermann,
have suggested that the difficulty of political adjustment of the WTO bar-
gain makes the legitimacy of judicial activism in the WTO more precari-
26. See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 315, 338-45 (2008) (describing amicus participation on the democratic system
framework and citing different types of active amicus groups); Joseph Keller, The Future
of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions
for Future Developments, 33 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 449, 456-62 (2005) (describing the
benefits of amicus briefs).
27. See Lanoszka, supra note 5, at 668 (stating that the WTO is a member-driven
organization).
28. DSU arts. 14, 17.10, 18.2.
29. See VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 22, at 213.
30. See Appellate Body Report, European Community- Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) thereinaf-
ter EC-Hormones Appellate Body Report].
31. Communication from the Chairman of the Panels, United States- Continued Sus-
pension of Obligations in the EC- Hormones Dispute, Canada- Continued Suspension of
Obligations in the EC- Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/8, WT/DS321/8 (Aug. 2, 2005).
32. DSU arts. 14, 18.2.
33. Id. art. 17.10.
34. See Mareike Meyn, The WTO Doha Round Impasse (Overseas Dev. Inst., London),
Sept. 2008, at 1-2.
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ous.35 But as Susan Esserman and I have suggested, one could look at this
relationship in a different way.36 In the presence of political and diplo-
matic impasse, the judiciary has an enhanced role in the preservation of
the legitimacy of the system through evolving its practices to reflect shifting
conceptions of legitimate international order. 3 7 It is remarkable in this
connection that, while many WTO members have responded to the
impasse by shifting focus to regional and bilateral negotiations and agree-
ments,38 the WTO dispute settlement system remains vital and, anecdot-
ally, seems to be preferred to regional or bilateral dispute settlement
processes to settle disputes that could arguably be brought in either
forum.
3 9
A different way in which the WTO judiciary has arguably responded
to the "humanity-law" revolution is through what might be called virtual
representation of non-governmental stakeholders in its interpretation of
WTO law.40 The notion of "indirect effect" developed by the panel in the
US-Section 301 case captures most pointedly the conception that these
interests are virtually present in WTO dispute settlement. 4 1 According to
the panel:
The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but
also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack of security
and predictability affects mostly these individual operators.
7.77 Trade is conducted most often and increasingly by private operators. It
is through improved conditions for these private operators that Members
benefit from WTO disciplines. The denial of benefits to a Member which
flows from a breach is often indirect and results from the impact of the
breach on the market place and the activities of individuals within it ....
7.78 It may, thus, be convenient in the GATT/WTO legal order to speak not
of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of indirect effect.4 2
35. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court": Some
Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36
J. WORLD TRADE 605, 633-34 (2002).
36. See Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, FOREIGN AFF.,Jan./Feb.
2003, at 130, 133-35 (giving examples where the Appellate Body judiciary has adapted
to new interpretations of legitimate government actions under the WTO agreement).
37. See id.
38. See Peter Fuchs & Klaus Schilder, Watch Out Beyond the WTO: The EU's Aggres-
sive Multi-Level Trade Agenda, WEED (World Econ. Ecology & Dev., Germany), Oct.
2004, at 1, available at http://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/Watch%20out%20
beyond%20the%20WTO.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Rafael Leal-Arcas, Choice of Jurisdiction in International Trade Disputes:
Going Regional or Global?, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 55 (2007) (noting that in the WTO
Canada-Patent Term case where either forum was arguably proper, the United States
chose the WTO settlement system over the regional NAFTA settlement process).
40. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in
the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L LJ. 353, 356 (2004) (describing how the WTO "providles]
virtual representation for the public's interest in free trade").
41. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/
DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
42. Id. 11 7.76-7.78.
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Now consider the following statement of the Appellate Body in the
EC-Hormones I dispute:
[A] panel charged with determining, for instance, whether "sufficient scien-
tific evidence" exists to warrant the maintenance by a Member of a particu-
lar SPS measure may, of course, and should, bear in mind that responsible,
representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence
and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life terminating, damage to
human health are concerned. 4 3
Here, the Appellate Body would seem to be according an extra margin
of deference (based on the precautionary principle) 4 4 to the judgment of
WTO member states, but only where those states have "responsible, repre-
sentative governments." 45 We know that not all WTO Members are
democracies-one need only think of Burma, China, or Saudi Arabia. 46
Thus, the principle of deference here is not based on state sovereignty and
national prerogatives, but rather is based on the responsibility of the state
to protect its people and its accountability to citizens' interests and
needs.
4 7
This human-centered, as opposed to state-centered, vision is also
apparent in the EC-Asbestos case, in which the Appellate Body dealt with a
challenge to a French ban on asbestos, a substance responsible for
thousands of deaths and instances of serious illness.48 In its application of
the GATT's non-discrimination norm, 4 9 and as part of its analysis of
National Treatment, 50 the Appellate Body considered the health effects of
asbestos in determining whether physical differences between asbestos and
substitute products that France did not ban were sufficiently important for
the products not to be considered "like."'5 1 The health exception in Article
XX of the GATT shields the prerogative of governments to regulate for
health purposes. 5 2 Therefore, the panel of first instance determined that
43. EC-Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 30, cl 124.
44. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1003-04 (2003) (describing the precautionary principle as "[u]ntil safety is established,
be cautious; do not require unambiguous evidence").
45. EC- Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 30, 9 124.
46. See Morton H. Halperin & Kristen Lomasney, Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review
of the Record, 9 J. DEMOCRACY 134, 143 (1998) (indicating a suppression of democracy in
Burma); John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett & Michael L. Berbaum, Causes of Peace: Democ-
racy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992, 47 INT'L STUD. Q.
371, 388 (2003) (indicating that China is not democratic); Michael L. Ross, Does Oil
Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 333 (2001) (indicating that Saudi Arabia is not
democratic).
47. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an
Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 825, 845 (2002) (discussing the deference the
WTO accords to national health policies because of a state's duty to protect its citizens'
health).
48. See generally Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24.
49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
50. National treatment is the prohibition on less favorable treatment of imported
products in relation to "like" domestic products. See id. art. 111:4
51. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24, 1 114.
52. GATT art. XX.
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health considerations should be limited to the application of that exception
and had no place in the analysis of National Treatment.5 3 The Appellate
Body, however, responded that one could take into account such effects,
not from the state's point of view, but from that of the consumer.5 4 When
the Appellate Body considered the health exception in Article XX, it addi-
tionally determined that human life and health were interests of the first or
highest importance.5 5 Currently Article XX of the GATT contains a range
of exceptions, and the states that agreed to these exceptions did not estab-
lish any hierarchy between the regulatory fields protected under Article
XX. 56 If one views Article XX as a reservation of state sovereignty, it seems
inappropriate for the Appellate Body to tell states which of their sovereign
interests is of the highest importance.5 7 But if one regards Article XX from
a human-centered, not state-centered, perspective, then it makes perfect
sense to give the utmost importance to human life and health. 58
Additionally, the Appellate Body has "virtually" enfranchised non-
state actors by introducing international legal and policy instruments that
speak to and reflect the activism of those non-governmental stakeholders
in WTO dispute settlements. 59 Thus in its first Shrimp ruling, the Appel-
late Body referred to international instruments on biodiversity to interpret
the expression "conservation of exhaustible natural resources" as includ-
ing living resources, i.e., endangered species such as sea turtles. 60 The
Appellate Body referenced these international instruments on diversity
even though it could have reached the same conclusion simply by citing
old GATT cases as authority for this proposition and even though not all
WTO members were signatories to these instruments or parties to the dis-
pute in question.6 1 Arguably, the Appellate Body probably cited to these
instruments to "virtually" enfranchise environmentalist constituencies. It
is perhaps no coincidence that this is the very same case where, for the first
time, the Appellate Body held that WTO panels and the Appellate Body had
the discretion to receive and consider amicus briefs from non-governmen-
tal actors. 62
The WTO legal system, and particularly the dispute settlement system,
has shown its capacity for evolution through incremental practice and has
thereby demonstrated its efficacy and ability to adapt to change in interna-
53. Panel Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, 8.129-8.130, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
54. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24, I 117-123.
55. Id. 172.
56. GATT art. XX.
57. See, e.g., Howse, supra note 6, at 1547.
58. See id.
59. See generally Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 23.
60. Id. 11 131-135 (referring to one of a handful of major instruments on biodivers-
ity, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243). Environmental NGOs
influenced the negotiation of these international instruments on biodiversity. See id.
61. For a list of parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, see List of Parties,
http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
62. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 23, 1 89-91.
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tional law, politics, and economics in the absence of formal "constitu-
tional" amendments or overhaul. 63 In particular, it has been able to
interpret its founding treaties, such as the DSU, as allowing for the partici-
pation of non-governmental actors.64 The Appellate Body's decision-mak-
ing now reflects a more human-centered approach that shows an evolution
from the historically state-centered approach of GATT dispute settlement.65
The WTO's dispute settlement system has shown its capacity to evolve in
light of the "humanity-law" revolution through doctrinal innovations that
reflect a sensitivity to the values and interests of multiple constituencies,
including a variety of non-governmental stakeholders. 6 6 Each of the
changes discussed above may in itself seem small, but in the face of an
impasse in the Doha Round negotiations these innovations, taken together,
provide an important ground for hope that the WTO has at least some
resources that will allow it to remain relevant and legitimate in a world of
constant change in dominant values, institutions, and technology.
63. See Yanovich, supra note 3, at 248-49.
64. For example, the Appellate Body has interpreted the DSU as permitting partici-
pation of non-governmental actors via the use of appellate briefs. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 24 (demonstrating the
Appellate Body's ability to consider the health effects of a governmental decision from
the point of view of the consumer).
66. See, e.g., Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 23.

